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ABSTRACT 
This article compares and contrasts the way a set of fundamental issues are treated in 
social representations theory and discursive psychology.  These are: action, representation, 
communication, cognition, construction, epistemology and method.  In each case we indicate 
arguments for the discursive psychological treatment.  These arguments are then developed 
and illustrated through a discussion of Wagner et al. 1999 which highlights in particular the 
way the analysis fails to address the activities done by people when they are producing 
representations, and the epistemological troubles that arise from failing to address the role of 
the researcher’s own representations. 
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Over the past fifteen years discourse and rhetorical analysts and discursive 
psychologists have developed a connected set of critiques of social representations theory 
(Billig, 1988, 1993; Litton & Potter, 1985; McKinlay & Potter, 1987; McKinlay et al.,  1993; 
Potter, 1996a, b; Potter & Billig, 1992; Potter & Litton, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 
1998).  This critical work has appreciated the aims, scope and sophistication of social 
representations theory while disagreeing with a number of its theoretical and analytic 
assumptions.  While we are impressed by Wolfgang Wagner, Gerard Duveen, Matthias 
Thermel, and Jyoti Verma’s (1999) study, and interested by its findings, we believe it 
continues to display the fundamental flaws in the current version of social representations 
theory.   
In this commentary we will first overview general problems with social 
representations theory (SRT) as identified by discursive psychology (DP) and then highlight 
the way these problems are displayed in Wagner et al.’s paper.  We will highlight a range of 
fundamental differences in an attempt to counter the increasingly common view that DP is 
merely ‘enlarging and detailing’ or ‘complementing and deepening’ central aspects of SRT 
(Flick, 1998: 6; Moscovici, 1998: 246).  We believe contrasting rather than merging the 
perspectives will lead to more clarity in theory and analysis. 
 
SOME PROBLEMS WITH SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS THEORY 
 
 Perhaps the clearest way to overview problems with social representations theory is 
to list a set of basic concepts where there are disagreements with discursive psychology, and 
indicate the arguments for the discursive psychological approach. 
1.   Action.  One of the primary differences between SRT and DP lies in the way they 
characterize action, and in the relative importance they place on it.  In DP, action is 
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conceptualized in terms of the enormous range of practical, technical and 
interpersonal tasks that people perform while living their relationships, doing their 
jobs, and engaging in varied cultural domains.  Action (practices, getting stuff done – 
the precise term is not meant to carry weight here) is central to people’s lives, and 
therefore central to understanding those lives.  We are not the first to observe that 
SRT does not provide any elaborate account of action (cf. Wagner, 1998).  This 
failure to theorise action is at the heart of a range of problems; in particular, it leads to 
methodological blind-spots, it encourages the drift towards cognitive reductionism, 
and it places crucial limitations on the way the central concept of representation is 
theorized. 
2. Representation.  Representation is an important notion in both SRT and DP.  
However, it has almost the opposite role in each perspective.  In SRT representations 
are primarily cognitive phenomena (although they are sometimes considered as 
cultural objects) which enable people to make sense of the world.  The collective 
nature of this sense-making is taken to enable intra-group communication and to 
provide a technical definition of the boundaries of social groups.  In DP 
representations are discursive objects which people construct in talk and texts.  
Analysis has not concentrated on the sense-making role of representations (although 
this is not excluded in principle), but on the way the representations are constructed as 
solid and factual, and on their use in, and orientation to, actions (assigning blame, 
eliciting invitations, and so on).  Representations are treated as produced, performed 
and constructed in precisely the way that they are for their role in activities.  For this 
reason, discursive psychologists treat understanding activity as the key to 
understanding representations (Potter, 1996). 
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3. Communication.  In SRT, one of the primary roles of social representations is to 
facilitate intra-group communication.   In DP, the communication metaphor is 
rejected as inadequate for dealing with the complexities of action and interaction.1  
We doubt that SRT researchers would have much success if they attempted to make 
sense of a transcript of conversational interaction, say, if they try to discern 
‘messages’ and places where they are ‘transferred’ from speaker to speaker.2  Indeed, 
SRT researchers have simply avoided that problem by ignoring interaction and 
disparaging conversation as ‘babble’ (Moscovici, 1985).  Conversation thus has the 
anomalous position of being at the heart of SRT as the engine for the generation and 
refinement of representations, and yet being a topic which has received no analytic 
attention, and where the relevant literature in conversation analysis (Hutchby & 
Wooffitt, 1998; Sacks, 1992) has been ignored. 
4. Cognition.  One of the features of SRT which has attracted mainstream social 
cognition workers has been its retention of central elements of perceptual-
cognitivism.  Perceptual-cognitivism treats people as perceivers of incoming 
perceptual information which they process in various ways (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
In SRT representations are, mostly, treated as cognitive structures or grids which 
make sense of information, particularly about unfamiliar social objects.  DP rejects 
perceptual-cognitivism in favour of a systematic reformulation of cognition as a 
feature of participants’ practices, where it is constructed, described and oriented to as 
people perform activities.  Cognition is thereby moved from being an explanatory 
resource to a topic of study.  This facilitates the study of practices and avoids a range 
of confusions that arise from the cognitive analysis of talk and texts (Edwards, 1997; 
Potter, 1998a). 
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5. Construction.  It is commonplace now to characterise both SRT and DP as 
constructionist.  Social representations are not treated simply as devices for people to 
perceive (or misperceive) their social worlds – they construct the nature and value of 
those worlds.  Where SRT and DP sharply differ, however, is in the nature and scope 
of this construction.  While in SRT it is primarily a perceptual-cognitive process 
(involving the mechanisms of anchoring and objectification), in DP construction is 
done in talk and texts as specific versions of the world are developed and rhetorically 
undermined.  In DP, then, construction is more analytically tractable, because the way 
representations are constructed, established and undermined can be studied using a set 
of materials.3 
6. Epistemology.  SRT has been developed as a theory of knowledge, including an 
account of differences between the consensual and reified universes (roughly common 
sense vs. scientific knowledge).  DP has not developed a theory of knowledge as such; 
rather it has developed a relativistic and reflexive approach to knowledge, where what 
counts as knowledge in different social and cultural settings is part of what is at stake 
in discourse practices.  Particularly striking here is the wide range of recent, and not 
so recent, work in the sociology of scientific knowledge which makes problematic the 
distinction between the reified and consensual universe (e.g. Ashmore, 1989; Knorr 
Cetina, 1998; Latour, 1987).  At another level, whereas discursive psychologists have 
attended to the reflexive relationship between their own categories, claims and textual 
forms, and those of their participants (Ashmore, et al. 1995; Edwards, 1997; Mulkay, 
1985), social representations theorists have not concerned themselves with the status 
of their own representational practices.  Problems arising from this inattention have 
been highlighted in a number of DP discussions of SRT (e.g. Potter, 1996; McKinlay, 
et al. 1993). 
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7. Method.  SRT research has utilized a range of different social science methods, 
including surveys, interviews, experiments and ethnography.  However, the major 
point of conflict with DP is not over the selection of a particular method, but in 
SRT’s failure to conceptualize the activities that are being done, and oriented to, when 
participants develop representations in their talk or texts in any of these methods.  The 
action orientation of accounts, descriptions and versions is systematically overlooked 
in the attempt to use social science methods to reach hypothetical underlying, yet 
shared, cognitive representations.  This may be the reason why SRT researchers have 
shied away from critical work on method in sociology and anthropology which 
problematizes language use and representation (e.g. Atkinson, 1990; Cicourel, 1974).  
Most importantly, SRT is overwhelmingly perceptual-cognitive in its theorizing, 
while its analytic materials are overwhelmingly discursive. 
These points are linked together around SRT’s perceptual-cognitivism with its sense-making 
account of representations, which provide a code for communication, and construct mental 
versions of the world, and can be researched using a range of social science methods.  The 
DP alternative takes a systematically contrastive position for the reasons indicated above.  
These reasons can be fleshed out through considering Wagner et al.’s (1999) article on 
different notions of madness in Indian discourse. 
 
MADNESS AND INDIAN SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
 
Wagner et al. concern themselves with representations of madness, in the standard 
SRT manner, as mentally encoded templates for sense-making.  They do not ask the kinds of 
questions that discursive psychologists might ask, such as how particular descriptions of 
‘madness’ are used to do particular things.  They are not concerned with the way a 
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construction of madness might be used as part of a relationship conflict, when accounting for 
absence from work, or in criticising the behaviour of a neighbour.  Not only do they not 
address these questions, their methodology makes it very hard to address them; for it provides 
participants with only a pre-formed vignette in which madness is a textual fait accompli.4  
Moreover, participants are recruited to act as quasi-psychologists, theorizing about how they 
might act or might think in a generic situation in which they have no stake or interest. Thus, 
despite the use of qualitative, conversational interviews, the materials are dealt with using the 
epistemological frame of traditional social cognition.5   
What the authors do not study is the way descriptions, avowals, accounts and 
explanations of and using ‘madness’ might figure in their participants’ everyday discursive 
practices.  What kind of cultural ecology are we dealing with?  We don’t know, and can’t 
know from this study, how these people speak about madness in their families, with doctors 
and healers, when gossiping with their friends, and so on.  The method separates participants 
from such an ecology, and what may be locally organized, action-oriented descriptions are 
forced into participants’ heads as cognitive objects. 
Even using interviews, Wagner et al. could have considered the way description 
production is related to particular activities.  Instead, the participants are treated in the 
traditional manner as disinterested people doing their best to answer questions.  There is no 
sense of interview talk as an arena where a range of issues to do with stake, identity, 
justification, morality, and so on can and do become relevant (see Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 
1995).  This is shown most simply in the way the talk is overwhelmingly treated as owned 
by, and inferable back to, the interviewee, rather than a co-construction of both parties.  In 
the majority of cases the interviewer’s question is not quoted; instead we are given segments 
of participants’ talk isolated from what might have occasioned them, with little choice but to 
interpret them as free-standing participants’ views.  This stripping off of the action 
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orientation of talk is reinforced by presenting it in cleaned up ‘playscript’ form which 
systematically removes action-indicative features of delivery such as stress, intonation, delay, 
pace and volume. 
Another way in which Wagner et al. disattend to the action orientation of their 
materials is a consequence of their failure to theorise their specifically ‘interview’ nature; that 
is, the way that the participants ‘do’ interview talk, and what they are accomplishing when 
they speak in such a way.6  The mixture of social representations ‘expressed’ in the interview 
may reflect the participants’ sensitivity to the interviewer’s concerns, as they talk to people 
from a very topic relevant university-based domain of psychological science.  Moreover, 
when the interviewer emphasises that they are ‘not interested in factual or school knowledge, 
but in what the interviewee believed’ (ms. 13), they are providing the participants with a 
criterion for how to speak which embodies the very dichotomy that they then discover in their 
materials.  Interactional dynamics of this kind, which are grist to the mill of DP, make it 
difficult to accept participants’ talk as an expression of largely ready-made, all-purpose views 
of life. 
From the point of view of DP, then, the treatment of representations in terms of 
cognitive sense-making, rather than activities, is accomplished by analytic fiat.  Cognitive 
sense-making is not discovered in the materials, it is defined into them.  Conversely, the 
absence of action is not discovered in the materials, it is gerrymandered out of them, by the 
methods of data collection and analysis. 
The SRT distinction, between the expression of the representation in talk and its 
existence in some mental space, provides considerable analytic elasticity and makes it 
difficult to assess the adequacy of particular claims.  It discourages the researcher from 
attending to the precise details of the talk which might be of interest in a DP analysis with its 
action focus.  For example, the term ‘adjust’ is discussed (ms.: 20-1), and it is noted that the 
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use of English rather than Hindi by participants might signal a critical view towards 
‘adjustment’ among Westernized middle-class respondents.  Yet the one extract that is quoted 
does not provide evidence of this ‘critical view’ (the speaker claims that they would ‘adjust’ 
if appropriate without constructing it as an accountable matter), but it does indicate the way 
that the notion of ‘adjustment’ might be used to assign blame.  The woman described in the 
narrative is treated as having the problem of ‘adjustment’; the battering husband is not treated 
as at fault. 
The Wagner et al. study illustrates some of the reflexive and epistemological troubles 
that are characteristic of SRT research.  At its simplest, the issue is this: what is the 
representation-free framework through which participants’ representations can be 
understood?  Or, more pithily, whose representations are privileged, the researchers’ or the 
participants’?7   
The trouble becomes most acute with respect to the distinction between ‘traditional 
healing’ and ‘modern psychiatry’.  Is this distinction found in the material by the analyst 
identifying utterances as traditional or modern, using their own judgement on these matters?  
Or is it a dichotomy that is demonstrably relevant for the participants themselves?  In other 
words, as well as moving between what the analyst judges to be different kinds of social 
representations, do the participants display a concern for that difference, an orientation to it? 
Do they, for instance, treat the invocation of traditional ideas, when talking to a psychologist-
interviewer, as accountable (requiring justification, etc.)?  In fact, the data and analysis 
includes both kinds of observations (analysts’ categorizations and participants’ orientations), 
but both are treated in the same way.  Indeed, participants’ orientations to the analytic 
framework may even be suppressed.  Note the way on (ms.) page 13, where the respondent 
says, ‘Now we have modern times. Initially in our society…’, the interviewer interrupts with 
‘You are slightly deviating…’ 
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This discursive distinction between ‘traditional healing’ and ‘modern psychiatry’ is 
treated as a surface manifestation of two cognitive representations underlying the discourse.  
The analysis does not attend to any business that might be being done by this specific 
formulation in the discourse.  For example, we can imagine it being used by a psychiatrist in 
Patna to encourage a client to act in particular ways – to take medication, to resist certain 
sorts of advice, and so on.  After all, the epithet ‘modern’ can be a powerful rhetorical device 
(for analysis of ‘modern’ in persuasive political discourse, see Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  
Moreover, the assumption made in Wagner et al.’s analysis is that (‘modern’) ‘Western’ 
psychiatry is unified and scientific.  This is not discovered in the interviewee’s 
representations, but assumed as an analytic presupposition.  
These points, while being generically at issue for SRT are, of course, especially 
pertinent for the current study as it claims to address differences in cultural representations.  
The risk is that they start with (a version of) Western psychiatry and then understand Indian 
cultural practices in Western psychiatry’s basic terms.  The authors gloss their study as 
discovering ‘the way in which a particular reality is simultaneously represented in two 
fundamentally different ways’ (ms.: 34).  However, this plays down how these different kinds 
of representations may ‘constitute their objects’ very differently.  What is this ‘particular 
reality’ that exists outside of representational practices?  Do traditional and modern (etc.) 
representations cover, and restrict themselves to, the same phenomena?  Surely not.  They 
collect different things together, and place them under different descriptions and 
categorizations and contrasts.  The assumption, that what the traditional representations are 
representations of is basically the collection of things studied by ‘modern psychiatry’, is at 
least a partial alignment with one of the representations under investigation.  It begs the 
deepest cultural-psychological questions.  For DP these questions will require serious analytic 
attention to the situated practices which such questions relate to. 
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SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OR DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Moscovici has recently responded to DP criticisms of SRT by suggesting that to ask 
‘whether language or representation is the better model can have no more psychological 
meaning than asking the question: “Does a man walk with the help of his left leg or his right 
leg?”’ (1998: 246).  We agree that it misleading to make an opposition between language and 
representation.  However, we have argued that an adequate study of representation (either in 
talk or cognition) requires attention to situated discourse practices.  SRT research continues 
to fail to do this, and continues to be flawed as a consequence.  
 11 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1  It is not merely the term communication itself.  Moscovici draws on the entire tropology of 
communication terminology when characterizing SRT.  Consider the following, where Moscovici is 
offering reasons for looking beyond ‘linguistic forms’: 
The richness and originality of meanings, this is indeed what we try to communicate to one 
another.  But in this communication linguistic forms are not enough to explain how the 
communicated message is received and then understood.  Why?  Because we perform many 
more practical operations on it before transmitting it or in order to receive it....  Too often the 
communication of a message does not coincide with linguistic communication properly 
speaking.  (1994: 164-5) 
 
2  The difficulty in providing a clear specification of even such an apparently straightforward notion as 
‘conversational topic’ illustrates this (Jefferson, 1993). 
 
3  Recent SRT commentators have suggested that the strong constructionism and relativism of discursive 
psychology is self refuting and allows no possibility for political commitment (Wagner, 1998; 
Moscovici & Markova, 1998).  There is not space to tackle these points in full here.  Suffice it to say 
that we view both of these claims as mistaken.  Weak constructionism, with its islands of epistemic 
privilege is less coherent in our view; and political commitment follows no more obviously from 
realism or weak constructionism than strong constructionism.  For developed arguments to this effect 
see: Edwards et al. 1995; Potter, 1998b. 
 
4  Contrast this to Smith (1978) and Palmer (1998), in which the category madness and how it is made 
objective is analytically topicalized. 
 
5  Discursive psychologists are not critical of research methods because they involve experimentation, 
manipulation or some other technique.  The critique is specifically directed against the (largely 
inexplicit) theory of discourse that is used in many research and analytic methods.  For further 
discussion of this point, see Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1997. 
 
6  See, for example, Heritage & Greatbatch (1991) on some of the ‘institutional’ features of interview 
talk. 
 
7  For a highly pertinent debate on this topic (which ought to be of interest to all cultural psychologists), 
see Schegloff (1997, 1998) and Wetherell (1998). 
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